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I. Introduction & Background  
What is a capital budget? Why does the federal government not have one? This paper 
attempts to address both questions. It explains how capital projects at the federal level are 
budgeted for on a cash-basis, as is the case for all spending in the unified budget, and why this 
matters. Specifically, it will consider how well this budgetary treatment leads to an efficient 
allocation of capital spending, government accountability, and long-term planning. It also 
examines alternative ways to budget for capital spending that have been proposed, their 
rationales, and whether they might lead to better outcomes. First, however, this paper turns to 
define “capital” and how other entities besides the federal government budget for capital 
projects. 
Defining Capital 
According to the broadest definition of the term, “capital” refers to any asset – physical 
or intangible – that provides benefits over the long-run (beyond the standard budgeting/reporting 
period). Most narrowly defined, capital includes only long-term physical assets (buildings, roads, 
equipment, etc.). Most governments, as well as the private sector, choose a definition for capital 
somewhere in between these two extremes. For example, the private sector generally limits its 
definition of capital to “physical and certain intangible assets (such as investments in intellectual 
property)” (Brown et al., 1999, p. 9). The definition of capital varies somewhat among state and 
local governments, but generally is restricted to physical and technological infrastructure. In the 
case of state governments, this sometimes includes grant monies distributed to localities. 
Meanwhile, the federal government defines capital as “land, structures, equipment, and 
intellectual property (including software) that are used by the Federal Government, including 
weapon systems” (Office of Management and Budget, 2011a, p. 1). Note that this description of 
capital at the federal level excludes grants to state and local governments for capital projects.  
Capital Budgeting by the Private Sector 
Private businesses make decisions on capital spending primarily using net present value 
(NPV) analysis to determine the profitability of the project. Furthermore, they are disciplined by 
the market and must factor in their financing options and long-term financial plan when choosing 
capital investments (Brown et al., 1999). 
The private sector accounts for the acquisition of capital assets on a full accrual basis. In 
other words, they “spread capital costs over the period when benefits are accruing from the 
investment” (Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 2008, p. 1). They do this by expressing the 
annual deprecation of physical capital assets (amortization for intangible assets) as an expense on 
the Income Statement of their financial report, rather than accounting for the full cost of purchase 
upfront as an expense. Any cash outlays are registered on the company’s Cash Flow Statement, 
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while the newly acquired asset and liability (if financed by borrowing) appear on the Balance 
Sheet. This accounting method best allows businesses to match earned revenues over the 
reporting period with the costs spent during that period to achieve them.  
Capital Budgeting by State and Local Governments 
As the President’s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting (PCSCB) explained in their 
report, state and local governments (SLGs) typically have formal tools in place, “either in statute 
or by practice,” for setting their capital spending priorities (Brown et al., 1999, p. 19). Moreover, 
similar to the private sector, SLGs are subject to some market discipline because they must work 
to maintain a strong credit rating in order to ensure they have the means to borrow. Most states 
are also subject to legal debt restrictions and balanced budget requirements that may either be 
statutory or constitutional. This latter issue helps to explain why SLGs generally maintain a 
separate budget and separate accounting fund(s) for capital projects. Balanced budget laws 
generally apply to the operating budget only, thereby allowing SLGs with a separate budget for 
capital projects to borrow to finance capital expenditures. Rather than score depreciation as an 
expense in the operating budget (similar to the private sector model), SLGs instead recognize 
capital debt service payments in the operating budget.  
Capital Budgeting by the Federal Government 
At the federal level, an agency’s mission and strategic goals play an important role in the 
decision-making process about which capital projects to pursue. Benefit-cost analysis is also 
applied to all major capital projects and typically this analysis must demonstrate that the project 
will yield positive net benefits to society in order for it to be approved. Unlike SLGs, the federal 
government does not maintain a separate, distinct budget for capital projects. And unlike the 
private sector, capital spending at the federal level is not budgeted or accounted for on a full 
accrual basis. Rather, the federal government budgets for both capital and operating expenditures 
in the unified budget on a cash-basis. This means that capital expenditures are subject to any 
discretionary spending caps in place for budget authority (BA) and outlays. While the total BA 
for a capital project is scored upfront, the outlays for a capital project may be spread out over 
several years (depending on the length of time over which the project will be completed). In this 
way, if the binding constraint is a cap on BA, capital spending projects may be at a greater 
disadvantage than if the constraint is on outlays (Brown et al., 1999). 
How does this treatment affect decision-making over the long run? The next section 
examines this question based on several selected criteria. 
 
II. Current Practice: Is it working? 
Economists and policymakers have long debated over whether capital spending should 
continue to be treated the same as other forms of spending by the United States Government. 
Does current practice promote efficient allocation of resources, government accountability, and 
long-term planning?  
Efficient Allocation of Resources 
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An efficient allocation of resources is reached when any change in allocation cannot 
make someone better off without making someone else worse off. Inefficiency is often the result 
of some type of market failure or distortion. Does the current budgetary treatment of capital 
spending distort decision-making, leading to too little or too much capital spending overall? 
Some would argue that it does, and specifically that there is a “macro bias” against capital 
spending (Brown et al., 1999). The basis of this argument is fairly straightforward. Under the 
current budgetary system, the total cost of capital projects is scored upfront, at the point of 
decision on whether or not to pursue the project. Meanwhile, the benefits of a capital project, by 
definition, accrue over the long-term (usually well beyond the standard reporting period). Thus, 
some argue that policymakers and federal agencies are reluctant to invest in capital acquisitions 
because they have to bear the cost at the start but reap the benefits in the future. Moreover, 
decision-makers are likely to be particularly averse to the budget spikes created by capital 
projects when their budget authority is constrained by some type of cap. 
A classic example of this issue can be observed by considering federal agencies’ 
decisions to either purchase or lease a building. Under the current budgetary treatment, if an 
agency purchased a building in 1980 for $20 million, with an estimated lifetime use of 30 years, 
the on-budget cost of that acquisition for 1980 would have been $20 million. However, if that 
same agency entered into a lease agreement with that building’s owner, whereby the agency paid 
$2 million per year to use the building, and at the end of 15 years, the building belonged to the 
agency, then the on-budget cost of that acquisition for 1980 would have been scored as $2 
million. Even though purchasing the building makes the most economic sense, from a budgetary 
perspective, one can see how the agency might be tempted to enter into the lease-purchase 
agreement instead so that it doesn’t show a spike in its budget. This example illustrates how 
capital spending decisions may be distorted by the way they are treated in the budget. 
Fortunately, in the case of lease-purchase agreements and other arrangements defined as 
“capital leases,” scorekeeping reforms have been passed to help prevent this type of behavior by 
agencies. The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), passed in 1990, differentiates between operating 
leases and capital leases, and requires that the discounted present value of a capital lease or 
lease-purchase over the life of the contract be scored upfront (OMB, 2011b). This and other 
policies introduced over the years help guard against perverse incentives that result in inefficient 
decision-making. There is no empirical evidence to support that the U.S. budgetary treatment 
results in a bias against capital spending. In fact, PCSCB observed that in some cases, it is 
possible that the bias goes in the opposite direction. For example, if the binding constraint faced 
by policymakers is a cap on outlays, capital expenditures that can sometimes have low outlay 
rates may look more attractive than spending on operating expenditures with high outlay rates 
(Brown et al., 1999). However, there is no definitive evidence to support the view that there 
exists either a positive or negative bias for capital spending. 
Accountability 
How well does the current budgetary treatment of capital spending promote the use of 
evaluation techniques and performance management to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency 
of capital projects? Since capital spending is on-budget and therefore subject to the 
appropriations process, the federal government is held accountable to some extent to demonstrate 
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the success of existing capital projects and a justification for new projects. For the same reason, 
capital spending is also fairly transparent, which also helps to promote accountability.  
On the other hand, the current process does not require the federal government to budget 
for depreciation of assets or deferred maintenance – that is, “the estimated cost to bring 
Government-owned property, plant, and equipment to an acceptable condition, resulting from not 
performing maintenance on a timely basis” (Financial Management Service, 2011). While 
deferred maintenance information is included as required supplementary information in federal 
financial reports (Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB, 2011), not requiring 
agencies to budget for it makes it difficult to hold them accountable for proper use and 
management of assets. Capital Acquisition Funds (CAFs) can help in this regard to an extent, 
and will be discussed further below. 
Long-term Planning 
Finally, does budgeting for capital spending on a cash-basis alongside other forms of 
spending in the budget support effective planning over the long run? In order to achieve this 
objective, the budgetary treatment of capital should indicate the costs that will be borne by future 
generations as a result of decisions made today. Keeping capital spending on-budget means that 
the budget deficit more accurately reflects these costs. In this way, the treatment assists in long-
term planning. Moreover, since capital projects are on-budget and must be approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), they are subject to benefit-cost assessment 
requirements, which also support long-term considerations. Finally, by scoring the full price of 
capital projects upfront, the long-term costs of a project are matched with the decision to incur 
them. Arguably, with respect to the federal government that will eventually be supported by 
future generations, the importance of this decision framework outweighs the usefulness of 
matching current-year costs with current-year benefits (as the private sector strives to do). 
On the other hand, if the amount of government spending on capital is distorted by the 
way it is treated in the budget for the reasons discussed above, then this could mean that the 
government is not investing enough now in capital projects that will more than pay for 
themselves over time, or that it is investing too much in projects that will result in negative net 
benefits over time. Again, if this is an issue, CAFs may offer a solution, as they would attempt to 
match the “irrevocable loss” incurred by the decision to acquire a capital asset that could be 
resold (to be discussed further below). Moreover, because the federal government does not 
budget for depreciation or deferred maintenance, the budget deficit does not provide an accurate 
estimate of the costs that will be borne by future generations. 
 
III. A Federal Capital Budget? 
The discussion above highlights some of the major strengths and weaknesses of the 
current budgetary treatment of capital spending. Some argue that outcomes would be improved if 
the federal government were to budget for capital projects separately from other types of 
spending and do so on a full accrual basis. This alternative method is explained and discussed 
below. 
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How It Would Work 
This budgetary treatment would closely mimic how the private sector accounts for capital 
spending. With this option, the federal government would recognize an asset’s annual 
depreciation, not its purchase cost, as an expense in the operating budget, which would be funded 
through appropriations (Brown et al., 1999). In other words, this approach would replace the 
current cash-basis budgeting process for capital assets with an accrual accounting system, 
thereby changing the timing of when capital spending costs are recognized in the budget.  
The main argument in support of this alternative is that capital spending is unique in that 
its benefits extend over a long period of time. Having a separate capital budget would mean that 
policymakers would not have to make direct tradeoffs between spending on capital (long-term 
investments) and operating expenditures (immediate-term investments). Moreover, accounting 
on a full accrual basis would allow the government to spread costs over the useful life of the 
asset. Advocates for this reform believe such treatment would eliminate any bias against capital 
spending caused by the current system. If there is in fact such a bias presently, this approach may 
indeed help promote a more efficient allocation of resources. Additionally, this system would 
require by necessity that the federal government budget for depreciation of its capital assets, 
which would help promote accountability and long-term planning as discussed above. 
Arguments against a Federal Capital Budget 
Despite the benefits that a federal capital budget could provide, the United States 
Government has chosen not to adopt one thus far. Why is that? There are numerous reasons 
explaining why so many policymakers and experts, including the PCSCB and the President’s 
Commission on Budget Concepts (Kennedy et al., 1967), have opposed a separate budget for 
capital at the federal level, which mainly fall into four categories: 
1. Technical challenges 
2. Increased borrowing 
3. Reduced transparency 
4. Inefficient allocation of spending 
This paper will cover each of these points in turn. 
1. Technical challenges 
The primary technical concern associated with a capital budget is the difficulty in gaining 
consensus on how capital should be defined. Provided implementing a federal capital budget 
would make it easier to obtain funding for capital projects, “program advocates would have 
strong incentives to get their proposals classified as capital spending” (CBO, 2008, p. 9-10), 
which could lead to conflict over how narrowly or broadly capital should be defined. As 
discussed above, the definition of capital is subject to interpretation. The table below describes 
all federal spending for FY 2011 which OMB defines as federal investment, which includes all 
“federal outlays that produce long-term benefits to the national economy” (Istrate & Puentes, 
2009, p. 2). Theoretically, all such spending might be classified as “capital spending,” which 
would amount to capital spending of approximately $538 billion. 
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Composition of Federal Investment Outlays (billions of dollars) 
 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 2012, p. 356. 
 
Meanwhile, using a more narrow definition, capital would only include the spending 
labeled as “federal capital” above, amounting to roughly $191 billion. This figure might be 
reduced even further if only assets able to be resold were defined as capital. Clearly, how one 
defines capital would have tremendous implications for how many spending programs would be 
transferred to the federal government’s capital budget, should it adopt one. Arguably, any 
relatively broad definition of capital, such as one that included certain intangible assets and/or 
grant monies to subnational governments for capital projects, lends itself to ambiguity, and could 
lead to a scenario in which the majority of federal expenditures could be classified as “capital 
investments.” For this reason, if a federal capital budget of some kind were to be adopted, it 
would likely be necessary to define capital quite narrowly and explicitly. 
2.  Increased borrowing 
A second claim commonly offered as an argument against a federal capital budget relates 
to the fear that this would provide the federal government with a license to borrow for any 
project that it classifies as “capital.” Because capital, by definition, is an asset that accrues 
benefits over the long-term, a case can be made that financing capital projects by borrowing is 
appropriate (presuming the project will pay for itself over time). This reasoning is largely why 
state and local governments maintain separate capital budgets, which allow them to get around 
balanced budget requirements. However, SLGs are also disciplined by credit market limitations 
in a way that the federal government is not (at least not yet). Because they compete with one 
another for residents, SLGs also have a greater incentive to ensure they remain in strong fiscal 
health and are not forced to raise taxes or cut services in the future due to poor planning and 
mismanagement than has the federal government, which does not have the same fear of resident 
Federal 
Capital
National 
Capital
Intangible
Assets
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“flight.” For these reasons, fears that excessive federal borrowing would take place with 
adoption of a separate capital budget are real.  
On the other hand, the PCSCB explained that the level of borrowing justified with a 
separate capital budget might be controlled by only permitting additional borrowing for “net 
investment” (gross investment minus depreciation). This would support long-term planning by 
making sure that an “undue burden” is not placed on future generations (Brown et al., 1999, p. 
43). 
3. Reduced transparency 
A report published by CBO (2008) on the pros and cons of a federal capital budget 
expressed concern that a separate budget for capital spending, recorded on an accrual basis, 
would threaten the transparency of capital spending. Cash-basis budgeting has its drawbacks – 
namely that it does not measure annual change in the government’s assets and liabilities – but it 
also has its advantages. In cash-basis reporting, transactions are “readily verifiable,” provide “a 
close approximation of the government’s annual cash deficit or surplus,” and are therefore 
“relatively transparent and easily understood” (CBO, 2008, p. 6-7). Accrual-based accounting, 
on the other hand, could potentially make capital spending by the federal government more 
difficult to track and subject to manipulation, since accrual measures are estimates and can be 
sensitive to underlying assumptions (p. 12). Reduced transparency, in turn, could threaten the 
public’s ability to hold policymakers accountable for capital spending projects. 
4. Inefficient allocation of spending 
While some argue that on-budget treatment and upfront scoring of capital projects leads 
to a built-in bias against capital spending, others fear that special treatment of spending on 
capital might lead to worse distortion in the opposite direction. CBO (2008) reports, “Adopting 
an accrual approach to only one aspect of the budget could raise concerns as to whether the 
budgeting system would provide a fair basis for allocating the government’s resources among 
competing priorities” (p. 1). This concern relates back to the earlier discussion of matching long-
term costs with the decision to incur them. By not counting the cost of an entire capital project 
upfront, policymakers may not be held as accountable for their decisions to undertake capital 
projects or acquire capital assets, which could lead to a bias in favor of capital spending.  
 
IV.  Capital Acquisition Funds 
Earlier this paper makes reference to capital acquisition funds, or CAFs. However, CAFs 
can serve different purposes depending on how they are designed and specifically whether or not 
they are on-budget.  
On-Budget CAFs 
Both the PCSCB and OMB advocate for the use of CAFs (or as OMB refers to them, 
capital acquisition “accounts” or CAAs) (Brown et al., 1999; OMB, 2011a). As they define 
them, a CAF or CAA is still on-budget and receives annual appropriations. However, it is a 
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separate account housed within a government agency with the budget authority to borrow from 
Treasury exclusively for capital acquisitions. This same account collects funding from sub-
agencies/programs as payment for use of the agency’s existing capital assets (office space, 
equipment, etc.). These payments are set so that they cover the cost of principle plus interest paid 
to Treasury annually for the same period and would only be used for repayment of debt to 
Treasury. This system works to help individual agencies smooth budget spikes caused by a new 
capital acquisition. It also serves a second purpose: to encourage sub-agencies and programs to 
use assets efficiently since they have to incur outlays to use them.  
The benefits of this approach are limited. For example, since these accounts or funds are 
still on-budget, they do not smooth spikes for the overall federal budget. A staff paper prepared 
for the PCSCB identified numerous other drawbacks of this approach, including that it would 
make operating programs which currently do not incur on-budget costs for use of capital assets 
more expensive (leading to potential pushback by program advocates) and technical challenges, 
such as what to do with existing assets (Capital Acquisition Funds, n.d.). Moreover, as a 
Government Accountability Office report asserted, while this budgeting method may help with 
transparency of program costs and therefore promotes accountability, it is not clear that it would 
have a meaningful impact on an agency’s incentives to manage assets, since payments from 
agency subunits to the CAF are offset by payments received by the CAF and therefore do not 
affect the budget deficit (GAO, 2005, p. 36). Thus, it is not clear to what extent an on-budget 
CAF improves allocation decisions. 
Non-Budgetary CAF 
A more substantial reform would be to make these CAFs non-budgetary and place them 
in the Means of Financing (M.O.F.). This approach would resemble creating a distinct federal 
capital budget like was discussed above. Under this system, the CAF would borrow from 
Treasury to finance the purchase of capital assets that would be owned, used and able to be 
resold by the federal government. No outlay would be scored for this borrowed amount. Then, 
the agency using the asset would make annual rent payments to the CAF in the amount that the 
asset is estimated to decrease in value for that year (corresponding to depreciation rate). These 
payments would be scored as outlays so that the consumption of capital, rather than the initial 
acquisition, is recorded as an expense (similar to the private sector). Then, when the asset is sold 
by the CAF, if the proceeds are less than the debt owed to Treasury for that asset, the agency 
program using the asset repays the debt (funded through mandatory appropriation). If proceeds 
exceed debt owed to Treasury, the amount in excess of debt is credited to the agency program, 
therefore encouraging sound asset management by the agency. 
Under this budgetary treatment, borrowing for capital acquisitions would not show up in 
the budget deficit and would not be subject to any spending cap, but would add to the national 
debt. This would eliminate any distortion created by the current system that causes agencies to 
make inefficient capital spending decisions (such as entering into a short-term lease when a 
capital lease is more cost-effective in the long run) to circumvent deficit or spending cap 
requirements. On the other hand, there is some risk involved with this approach for similar 
reasons to those listed for why the U.S. does not have a federal capital budget, which explains 
why both the PCSCB and OMB have historically recommended against adopting a non-
budgetary CAF. 
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V. Other Potential Budget Reforms 
Creating a separate capital budget or a non-budgetary capital acquisition fund would 
represent a dramatic change in how the federal government budgets for capital. However, there 
are other more modest changes that might improve the budgetary treatment of capital spending in 
a way that promotes efficiency, accountability, and long-term planning without posing some of 
the risks associated with the more extreme reform proposals discussed above.  
Refining Reporting Requirements for Deferred Maintenance 
One reform at the federal level that can improve outcomes in all of these areas entails 
strengthening reporting on deferred maintenance that federal agencies are required to perform. 
Because the budgetary treatment of capital does not require the federal government to budget for 
deferred maintenance or depreciation of its assets, there is concern that this creates a bias against 
asset maintenance spending. Tighter financial reporting standards in this regard can help improve 
this situation. In fact, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Boards (FASAB) just last year 
issued a new standard (SFFAS 40) refining the definition of deferred maintenance as a “first step 
toward improving reporting on deferred maintenance and repairs” (FASAB, 2011a, p. SFFAS 
40-1). FASAB has also recently drafted another new standard, currently pending approval, which 
further expands on and standardizes the reporting requirements pertaining to how deferred 
maintenance and repairs shall be measured and prioritized (FASAB, 2011b).  These changes will 
hopefully lead to better information that might inform decision-making on how to allocate 
spending on capital. It will also increase transparency and therefore accountability of 
government agencies to maintain their assets. And finally, it could assist in long-term planning 
by helping agencies foresee future spending requirements.  
Retrospective Analysis 
One additional reform that might help improve accountability and long-term planning of 
capital spending would be for OMB to require that more retrospective analysis of capital 
projects/acquisitions be performed. In theory, capital projects should at least pay for themselves 
over time, and ideally should result in positive net benefits to society. This view drives the 
requirement to perform benefit-cost analysis (BCA) at the point of decision on whether or not to 
pursue a capital project. However, BCAs are oftentimes wrought with uncertainty. More ex-post 
analysis could help improve the integrity of BCA as it is used to evaluate capital projects, and it 
could also help with planning for future, similar projects. For these reasons, the PCSCB included 
this idea as one of its recommendations (Brown et al., 1999). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The current budgetary treatment of capital spending to some extent supports the budget’s 
ability to promote efficiency, accountability, and long-term planning. Various reforms, such as 
those contained within the Budget Enforcement Act, have already been put in place to create the 
right incentives for policymakers when deciding on how to spend taxpayer dollars. Meanwhile, 
because capital spending is on-budget, subject to annual appropriations, and accounted for on a 
cash-basis, spending is fairly transparent and therefore helps with accountability. Also, since 
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capital is budgeted for on a cash-basis and scored upfront, a decision to undertake a capital 
project is effectively matched with the total cost of that project over its lifespan, which helps 
with long-term planning.  
Despite these strengths, there are also some drawbacks to the current treatment of capital 
spending as well. While benefits of capital spending, by definition, accrue over a long period, the 
budgetary costs are incurred upfront, which some believe leads to a below-optimal level of 
capital spending by the federal government. A separate capital budget accounted for on a full-
accrual basis or a non-budgetary capital acquisition fund would smooth budget spikes caused by 
capital spending and better match current-year costs with current-year benefits. However, as this 
paper illustrated, there are a number of valid reasons why many experts, including the PCSCB, 
do not recommend adopting such a drastic measure. Rather, they support more modest, 
incremental changes such as use of on-budget CAFs, better financial reporting on deferred 
maintenance, and increasing retrospective analysis of capital projects. Until there is enough 
compelling empirical evidence to support the argument that the current budgetary treatment of 
capital spending distorts policymakers’ decision-making, I would recommend the federal 
government refrain from adopting a separate budget for capital or a non-budgetary CAF and 
instead focus on smaller reforms that help promote efficient allocation, accountability, and a 
long-term outlook. 
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